Investigating a Political Deadlock

Grassroots Reconciliations
INVESTIGATING A POLITICAL DEADLOCK

Author : M. Imam Aziz
By any standards, the human tragedy of 1965 was a kind of violence that no one
could imagine would occur in the human history of Indonesia. There is no adequate
way to describe the mass killing of members of the Indonesian Communist Party,
which covered a widespread area and claimed hundreds of thousands, approaching
millions of victims, and was accompanied by the removal of the civil, political
and economic rights of the families left behind. What is even more surprising
is that an incident of this type and magnitude has not been able to foster a
consciousness or deep introspection by members of this nation so that the same
thing is not repeated.

Tracing the causes of this event, and its implications for Indonesia today should
be one of the important tasks in our political life. Cribb (1990) suggested
that there is a philosophical issue behind all of this. How can humans treat
each other in a way that is so inhumane? What ideology is capable of pushing
a person to such a terrifying pattern of murder: killing based on suspicion,
not through a legal process, without proper burials and so on?



Perhaps there were ideological motives in this case, besides the motives of
fear, revenge, adventure and so on. Nevertheless, a large part of the desire
to kill arose from feelings of personal interest and personal safety and not
from anything dictated by an official ideology. People view Pancasila as the
current ideology of the state, yet could this motive alone be a strong reason
for why the communists must be ‘completely annihilated’



Another possibility arises from the Islamic ideology in the form of using the
idiom “jihad” – “holy war” against the infidels
or unbelievers. Yet, since when have Indonesian Muslims been so “cruel”,
going beyond the fundamentalists in other parts of the world? Meanwhile, even
the most cruel picture of jihad tends to be applied with strict conditions as
a way to solve the final problem after there has been a failure to live together,
where usually there is peace between Muslim and non-Muslim parties. Moreover,
the term jihad applied strictly in the scope of wider activities is to promote
Islam through writings, self-reflection and peaceful proselytizing.



This “strange common soul” in our thinking has not changed since
that time Most of us still want to continue that “killing”. This
is proven by the fact that efforts to vocalise the background of the tragedy
always encounter obstacles. Anti communist sentiment is still rife amongst most
of society. The parliament and president have not shown any concern over this
tragedy that struck their people. The 2003 laws on the general election still
discriminate against the victims of the 1965 tragedy. Although they have the
right to vote, they are still forbidden to stand for public office.



* * *



It is only natural that there have been strong demands by the victims of the
1965 tragedy to claim back their civil and political, as well as economic and
cultural rights. The claims raised by different groups of victims are currently
still scattered and have not been put forward as a united effort at a comprehensive
national reconciliation. Furthermore, in some sections of society itself there
are marked differences in perception regarding “the past”, and the
biggest humanitarian tragedy is still considered as a truth and a historical
certainty.



As such, national reconciliation, which truly provides a place for those who
were victims in the past to meet with those considered the perpetrators is still
far from being realised. We must sincerely pioneer the need to collectively
examine a better future, with a guarantee that there will not be any more political
victims such as these.



* * *



The idea of “Reconciliation and Rehabilitation for Victims of 1965”
being carried out by the youth of Nahdlatul Ulama is focused on the victims
of the 1965 killings, for the following reasons:



First, the 1965 tragedy was of a very large scale in terms of the area it covered
and the number of victims it claimed. Murder and the loss of civil and political
as well as economic and cultural rights occurred from Aceh across to Papua,
with the number who lost their lives ranging from between 500, 000 to one million
people, as well as an uncountable number of other victims.



Second, the killings were accompanied by a stigmatization that was not only
applied to the victims but also to their families – and not only their
nuclear family, but also their extended family. This stigmatization has been
going on for a very long time, and if it is not dealt with presently, it will
extend into the future.



Third, this form of stigmatization is not merely ideological, but more than
that, extending to the loss of civil and political rights as well as economic
and cultural rights on a massive scale. It is multiple-victimization because
it includes the extended family. This has left a severe psychological trauma
on the victims.



Fourth, this tragedy involved other groups of civil society as the perpetrators,
and involved the largest segment of this nation, namely Muslims. In connection
with this, the conflict obtained a theological legitimacy.

Fifth, up to now sufficient steps have not been taken by groups of civil society
to support the process of reconciliation and rehabilitation for these victims
of 1965.



As such, concrete steps have started from “the point most possible”
at this time, these include: changing the perceptions and attitudes of Indonesian
society about the human tragedy that occurred in 1965. In general, Indonesian
society still understands the 1965 tragedy as a form of heroism, where those
who were “right” opposed those who were “wrong”, with
those who were right winning the battle. This understanding was validated by
a theological basis in the fight between Muslims (muslimun) and infidels or
unbelievers (kafir), which was won by the Muslims. This is parallel to the imagery
projected by the New Order regime, which considered the 1965 tragedy as a fight
between the patriots and the traitors to the nation. In conjunction with this
also is the general attitude in society up to now that takes issue with the
Indonesian Communist Party as the perpetrators of the coup d’etat of October
1, 1965 and as such justified or allowed the killings, stigmatization and the
removal of civil, political, economic and cultural rights.



For this reason we need to make serious efforts:



First, to bring about a new understanding in society that the 1965 tragedy and
all its repercussions was a national tragedy that must be regretted, and that
was not something appropriate for a democratic society.



Second, to provide a communal place for civil society and the victims of the
1965 tragedy to meet and share their feelings in order to achieve reconciliation,
creating a space together to forgive the past and not repeat a similar incident
in the future. As such a “clear” medium is needed as a place for
the conflicting parties to express the mistakes and the suffering of the past,
heading toward a clarification of history. We must facilitate the willingness
by the conflicting parties of the past to attend a meeting at “one table”
in a new atmosphere, to forgive each other, both at the level of the society
directly experiencing the tragedy, and at the level of the organizations.



Third, to urge the government to acknowledge that the 1965 tragedy was a national
tragedy in which large scale human rights violations occurred, and that the
government should take immediate steps to rehabilitate the victims of the 1965
tragedy, and to provide compensation.



* * *



Syarikat Indonesia started the reconciliation process by facilitating a meeting
between Nahdlatul Ulama members and victims of the 1965 tragedy with the following
steps:



1. Investigation.

This was an effort to review the past incidents according to the perpetrators
and witnesses, regarding the cause of the conflict, who was involved in the
conflict, and where and when the conflict occurred. The investigation was conducted
by considering factors of locality, to ascertain in greater detail any diversity
in the pattern of conflict. The investigation was carried out in 18 cities in
Java. The investigation findings revealed a variety of causes of the conflict,
of perpetrators and victims, in the time the conflict erupted, as well as in
the dominance of the ‘supra local’ forces and military influences.
This knowledge about the pattern of conflict at the local level would make the
mediation process easier.

2. Mediation

This was a process of building a new consciousness about the incident, a common
understanding about the conflict and its repercussions, and a new sympathy and
solidarity between members of civil society and the victims of the 1965 tragedy.
Mediation was conducted by bringing together the two parties in the conflict,
namely the NU members and the victims, by using the media that was available
including social, economic and religious groups. From meetings at the local
level came social activities that were done together by the NU members and the
victims. Meetings at the provincial level were meetings to plan the communal
activities, involving the NU directors, religious leaders from Islamic boarding
schools (pesantren), and victims. These were carried out in the three provinces
of East Java (Banyuwangi), Central Java (Semarang) and West Java (Bandung).
The outcome of the meetings was an agreement about the need to eradicate the
trauma experienced by victims and their families, to hold communal social and
economic activities, and about how NU would help to lobby to reclaim the good
names of the victims.

3. Advocacy

In the regional meeting it was agreed that the advocacy agenda would be to lobby
the government to acknowledge the 1965 incident as a national tragedy that involved
gross human rights violations, to revoke laws discriminatory to the victims
and their families, as well as the rehabilitate and provide compensation to
the victims.

4. Publicity Campaign

Efforts to change society’s perception about the 1965 tragedy were done
through publishing a book, publishing a newsletter containing testimony from
witnesses, conducting a seminars and an art performances to campaign for the
need for reconciliation with the victims of 1965. No less important is fostering
good relations between religious leaders and NU directors and the directors
of victims’ organizations (such as YPKP, LPKP etc.)

* * *



The scope of national reconciliation – with a focus on the tragedy of
1965 – is not limited to that between NU and the Indonesian Communist
Party (PKI), but is much wider. However, at least it represents a good start
if these two large sections of the nation can meet in a new spirit and new consciousness.
It is hoped that other sections of society will also soon feel the need to follow
suit.

Yogyakarta, 9th May 2003

M. Imam Aziz

Program Coordinator, Syarikat Indonesia, Yogyakarta.